Goals
This article aims to present the beginning of a procedure for metaphor identification in natural language use. There is a large amount of work on metaphor in language and thought that proceeds by piecemeal evidence gathering and presentation, especially in cognitive linguistics (e.g. Gibbs and Steen, 1999) , and this usually means that the evidence is relatively clear. However, when ideas and theories about metaphor are to be systematically tested against larger quantities of language use, things may be less clear-cut. The linguist needs a procedure to decide what counts as a metaphor and what does not, and preferably a procedure that leads other linguists to the same conclusions. This is particularly important in the present day and age, when large electronic corpora have become available to many researchers interested in natural language use. If metaphor scholars are to make good use of the opportunity presented to us by these means, then a reliable procedure for metaphor identification is of paramount importance. It is the aim of this article to present a first proposal for such a procedure.
The basic idea is simple. Since recent theory has it that metaphor is a matter of thought, the procedure begins with getting rid of all the linguistic surface features of text and discourse and translates all words into thoughts. It thus acts on the assumption that the identification of metaphor has to be linked to the analysis of the conceptual structure activated by language. In translating language into a list of thoughts, or propositions, it is easier to see which elements of these propositions have been used literally and which ones have been used metaphorically. This can be done by determining the nature of the referents of the concepts participating in the propositions: if a concept directly designates a referent in the projected text world (Werth, 1999) , it has been used literally; if it does not, it may be metaphorical. The criterion for metaphorical usage is the wellknown Lakoffian one of a conceptual mapping between two domains (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1986 Lakoff, , 1987 Lakoff, , 1993 .
To give a brief example, here is a short poem by Robert Browning, called 'Parting at Morning' (reproduced from Gardner, 1972 ):
Parting at Morning
Round the cape of a sudden came the sea, And the sun looked over the mountain's rim: And straight was a path of gold for him, And the need of a world of men for me.
The main text may be divided into propositions as follows: S1: P1 (COME SEA)
P2 (ROUND P1 CAPE) P3 (OF P1 SUDDEN) S2: P1 (LOOK-OVER SUN RIM) P2 (POSSESS MOUNTAIN RIM) S3: P1 (BE PATH STRAIGHT) P2 (FOR P1 SUN) P3 (OF PATH GOLD) S4: P1 (BE NEED STRAIGHT) P2 (FOR P1 SPEAKER) P3 (OF NEED WORLD) P4 (OF WORLD MEN)
We shall leave aside the analytical and notational conventions of the procedure for the moment, and concentrate on explaining the basic idea. Let us also assume that we can agree on the text world (Werth, 1999) or situation model (Kintsch, 1998) that is projected by these concepts, even though it is true that this may dramatically vary according to whether you know the companion poem 'Meeting at Night' or not (Steen, 2000) . Be this as it may, it is relatively straightforward to check which of the concepts in the list of propositions designates an element of the situation model directly or indirectly. The indirect cases are COME in S1, LOOK-OVER in S2, PATH and GOLD in S3, and STRAIGHT in S4. In each of these cases, a nonliteral comparative mapping between two domains has to be performed in order to achieve semantic coherence. In particular, the sea does not literally 'come' and 'look over', there is no literal 'path' or 'gold' for the sea, and the speaker's need is not literally 'straight'. These concepts do not directly relate to default referents in the situation model, but instead indirectly designate other literal referents in the situation, which are conventionally classified as entities, attributes of entities, or relations between entities. What these are is not our concern here; the main issue is that we can see that we need metaphorical mappings to get from the activated concepts to the intended referents in the projected situation.
It is the goal of this article to present the general idea of the procedure after a discussion of the theoretical assumptions informing the overall approach. It will also derive an operational definition of 'metaphor as thought' from the theoretical framework and advocate a strategy of beginning with clear cases in order to make a beginning with a solid application of the procedure. A demonstration of the procedure with reference to the Browning poem provides an illustration of how it is applied in practice.
It is important to explicate the limitations of this endeavour from the beginning. The main aim is to introduce, explain and demonstrate the possibility of the procedure. A discussion of the more complicated and problematic aspects of the approach is left for another article . And an illustrative discussion of the more detailed problems that may arise from analysing one linguistic expression after another is the topic of yet another article . Moreover, a general evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages lies outside the scope of the present contribution, too; this is partly catered for by the invited comments by Goatly, Kövecses, Gibbs, and Low and Cameron (all this issue) . The result of this division of labour is a consciously positive and didactic tone in the present article, which should not be mistaken for naïve optimism. There are many problems that remain to be solved. But the basic claim is that we can use the current approach to begin to actually face these problems.
Another limitation lies in the superficial nature of the procedure as regards identification itself, as has also been pointed out by Peter Crisp (2002) . I have shown elsewhere that genuine metaphor identification in the sense of relating linguistic expressions to underlying mappings requires at least five steps of analysis (Steen, 1999; cf. Semino et al., ms.) . The present proposal explicates only the first two steps, and makes tacit use of the other three steps all the time. It is certainly the case that in practice analysts continuously attempt to construct provisional comparison statements, analogies and mappings which have not been included in the current state of the procedure. These are desiderata for future work, and their implicit role in the successful application of the procedure should be acknowledged from the beginning. This does not detract from the value of attempting to fully explicate the first two steps, however, and that is what is on the agenda for the rest of this article.
Assumptions

Definition: metaphor is conceptual metaphor
It seems best to adopt the most widely accepted definition of metaphor that is currently available, the one of metaphor as a set of correspondences between two conceptual domains (Lakoff, 1993) . Such sets of correspondences can be represented as lists of entailments, as in the case of Lakoff, or as structure mapping graphs (e.g. Gentner, 1983 Gentner, , 1989 , but this is immaterial to the identification of metaphor in discourse. We agree about the definition of metaphor as long as it is clear that metaphors in discourse should be translatable into sets of underlying conceptual correspondences, which can (but need not) be labelled with what Lakoff has called mnemonics in the form of 'An A is a B'. For a complete reconstruction of the steps needed to accomplish such a translation, see Steen (1999) .
It should be noted from the beginning that this does not mean that metaphor is only conceptual. The concepts involved in metaphorical mappings also carry affective loads, and can be used in discourse to suggest a range of effects, including less ideational and more interpersonal ones. For instance, the concepts GOLD and STRAIGHT in the Browning poem have positive valences in terms of affect, and their analysis in these terms is not pre-empted by adopting a conceptual starting-point. However, our present concern is not the use or function of metaphor, but its identification. The crucial assumption is that technical metaphor identification by the analyst can be based on the conceptual criterion of nonliteral mappings.
Another detail is this. It is irrelevant whether a conceptual mapping is systematic across linguistic expressions or not: a mapping may be related to a large set of linguistic metaphors or it may represent a so-called one-shot metaphor. Thus, the use of COME in the first line of the poem is much more systematic than the use of STRAIGHT in the last line -the former has been described as a case of subjectification by Langacker (1990) . However, the idea is that we identify as metaphor any stretch of language that might have two underlying conceptual domains that can be crossed metaphorically.
Moreover, the assumption of a conceptual definition of metaphor is not meant to imply that we also actually start from metaphors as thoughts or concepts. What we as linguists have is language use and what we wish to end up with is a list of metaphors in the discourse which are grounded in a list of metaphorical mappings. The great difficulty of linguistic metaphor identification and analysis is how we get from the discourse to the list of mappings in a reliable fashion. This is the challenge of the entire undertaking of beginning with metaphor identification in authentic discourse.
An important addition to the definition of metaphor as nonliteral conceptual mapping is the injunction to identify as metaphor whatever can be analysed as metaphor according to the above criterion. This is to be opposed to the linguist speculating about the plausibility of people's actually understanding one thing in terms of another. We really do not know whether people retrieve or construct a metaphorical mapping when they understand came in the first line of the poem. Whether all linguistic metaphors are actually processed metaphorically, that is, related to conceptual metaphors in people's ongoing cognition, is an empirical question that may receive different answers in different conditions (Steen, 1994; Steen and Gibbs, 1999) . It is therefore important to include all possibilities for metaphorical processing, and proceed from there.
This also holds for using a writer's intentions as a criterion for metaphor identification. Most authors cannot be questioned about their intentions in using specific expressions, and if they could the validity of their self-reports would be questionable. One can hence only speculate about the actual intentions of metaphorical meanings. In a poem like Browning's 'Parting at Morning' it may be assumed that the verbal artistry is rather intentional and that the metaphorical uses of words and concepts are not accidental, but even in poetry some metaphors may be more deliberate than others. The point is that we cannot derive any facts about the intentions of metaphor producers or about interpretations of metaphor comprehenders on the basis of discourse analysis, only testable hypotheses. What we are dealing with is not the processes themselves, but the product of production and the stimulus of comprehension.
The adoption of such a deliberately broad-ranging and conceptual definition of metaphor has another clear consequence for the identification of metaphor in discourse. It is generally agreed that the linguistic expression of conceptual metaphors may vary widely. Conceptual metaphors may emerge as linguistic metaphors, similes, analogies, extended nonliteral comparisons and allegories, to name only the most obvious possibilities. Other divisions include personification, synaesthesia, and zeugma, while there are also the related categories of proverbs, sayings, idioms and symbols. The consequence of adopting the conceptual perspective on metaphor is that all of these diverging linguistic manifestations of metaphor are to be included in the analysis as metaphor. The linguistic and rhetorical subdivision of all of these cases will have to be deferred until a later stage (cf. Steen, 2001) .
Another, related consequence has to do with the role of deviance. Since many of the metaphors studied over the past two decades are part of conventional conceptual metaphors, they also give rise to standard ways of talking about things. Their surface forms do not strike one as deviant but natural -the abovementioned phenomenon of subjectification is a case in point. The notions of 'literal' and 'nonliteral meaning' have hence been reinterpreted, also resulting in a new function for the notion of deviance. Literal meaning can now be defined as the direct way of expressing oneself about a phenomenon, whereas nonliteral meaning involves the kind of mapping from one conceptual domain to another that is characteristic of metaphor (Lakoff, 1986) . Nonliteral meaning does not entail deviance but may just as much represent the norm, for metaphor, or indirect meaning based on nonliteral mapping between domains, may be the only conventional means available to the language user to communicate about a particular domain of experience. 
Operational definition: metaphorical thoughts are metaphorical propositions
The adoption of the conceptual starting-point also has an interesting consequence for the procedure of metaphor identification. The basic task is to move from language to thought and determine whether one or more concepts in an idea have been used metaphorically. The typical format of representing this level of analysis is the proposition. Metaphor identification can hence be profitably based on propositional analysis.
Propositions are conceptual representations of the basic idea units or thoughts in a text. They are related to predicate calculus and consist of a predicate and one or more arguments. In some cases, it is the predicate that is the nonliteral concept, in other cases, one (or more) of the arguments, and sometimes a combination of nonliteral predicate and argument use may be found. When a proposition contains one or more metaphorically used concepts, it may be called a metaphorical proposition. It presents a metaphorical thought. For instance, line 2 of the Browning poem expresses the thought that the projected entity of the sun stands in a projected relation of 'looking over' to the protected entity of the mountain's rim. The fact that we need scare quotes around 'looking over' suggests that the projected relation is expressed in a metaphorical fashion. This turns this thought, and proposition, into a conceptual metaphor.
The use of the term 'projected' above suggests that it is irrelevant whether we are dealing with a factual, imagined or fictional situation or state of affairs here. Concepts refer to, that is, evoke, projected states of affairs, which may or may not be matched against some world out there that is or is not immediately present. As propositions designate mental representations of projected states of affairs that have been expressed linguistically, the approach reflects a referential view of metaphor. Conceptual representations such as propositions capture the referential function of language by pointing to miniature situation models. Situation models may hence be used as the referential background against which the literal or nonliteral usage of a concept may be checked. This does not mean that such models have to be 'real', as in 'out there, in the real world': situation models may also be fantasies, fictions, lies, and so on. They are mental representations.
Propositions can only do their referential work if they first explicate the concepts concealed in linguistic surface phenomena by ellipsis and substitution and so on. For instance, the Browning poem quoted at the beginning of this article illustrates how 'for him' in line 3 is explicated as 'for the sun' in the corresponding proposition. More interesting for our present purposes, it also shows that line 4 contains a concealed metaphorically used concept, 'straight', which has been ellipted from the sentence but is revealed again by the propositional analysis. A linguistic approach to metaphor that restricts its attention to the words on the page could not discern this kind of metaphor, whereas it is essential to a discourse-oriented description of the text. The translation into propositions gets rid of the linguistic noise, as it were, to facilitate the decision whether the semantic elements of the content of a text are from the same domain of knowledge or not.
It should be observed that the approach does not imply that propositions capture all there is to say about metaphors as ideas. On the contrary, propositions are the tip of the iceberg; they are no more than a blueprint for the more complex conceptual mappings that metaphors are assumed to be. Moreover, as noted earlier, such fuller mappings also contain other information than abstract conceptual information, such as affective load and potential for imagery. There is an interesting issue in the Browning poem, for instance, which concerns the connection between the images of the sun looking over the mountain's rim and the sun's seeing a path of gold before him. This could activate the scenario of a mountain hike and could suggest that the sun is going to descend from the mountain along the path of gold during the day. What should be realized is that none of these aspects of metaphor is ruled out by adopting a propositional approach; rather, they are made accessible by moving away from the linguistic domain into the domain of the conceptual by the construction of propositions.
The method of propositional analysis used in our research is based on the one explained in the brief manual by Bovair and Kieras (1985) . It is a conceptual, psychological method in the sense that it aims to capture minimal idea units present in a text. It is not a logical approach to propositional analysis, although there is some overlap. Our preference for this method rests on its practical convenience and its position in discourse psychology as a means of getting at the conceptual structure of linguistic meaning. This is how we would like to frame the metaphor identification project, too. For there is a shared common ground between the generally cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor as conceptual on the one hand and the cognitive and computational psychological approaches to metaphor of Gentner, Gibbs, Glucksberg, Miller, Paivio and other researchers on the other hand (e.g. Ortony, 1993) .
The advantage of Bovair and Kieras's particular method is that it is explained in a small manual that has been used in studies of nonmetaphorical discourse by many psychologists in their studies of the relation between text and effect. It deals with discourse at the level of all non-embedded, semi-independent clauses (cf. Mann and Thompson, 1988) . These are first analysed as to their semantic nucleus, which depicts a particular state of affairs. Then you move on to analysing the satellites that predominantly indicate circumstances of the state of affairs; and finally you analyse all attributes of both the main elements of the nucleus and the main elements of the satellites. The procedure has a grammatical feel to it, but its results have been validated in experimental psychological research (e.g. Kintsch, 1998; Perfetti and Britt, 1995) .
Strategy: begin with clear cases
Once a discourse has been analysed as a list of ideas in the format of propositions, the actual identification of metaphor can begin. For every concept in each proposition, the question should be asked whether its decontextualized content is the one that holds for the referential application of the concept to some projected entity, relation or attribute in the text world. If the content is not directly applicable and has to be interpreted by means of setting up a nonliteral comparison, then the use of the concept is metaphorical. Everything boils down to decontextualized content.
Since dictionaries of concepts do not really exist, we need to return to the linguistic level, and check the meanings of the related content words. Decontextualized meanings of content words are offered by dictionaries, which offer abstractions of usage in the form of lists of typical interpretations (or senses) of words. The advent of corpus-based dictionary-making has moreover provided a basis for ordering these meanings in terms of frequencies. This does offer the opportunity to examine the most current meanings of a particular word. This even holds for noncontemporary texts, for it provides the analyst with a basis for deciding whether the words in such texts are likely to come across as metaphorical or not to the modern language user.
However, there is a difficulty here, because most frequent meanings may emphatically also include metaphorical ones. For instance, a verb like 'support' is listed in the COBUILD English Language Dictionary (ELD) as having an abstract meaning, of 'backing' with respect to politicians, whereas the concrete meaning 'hold up' or 'carry' comes only in sixth place. Although this listing does not have to reflect frequency of occurrence (nothing is said about this in the introduction to the dictionary), it does seem to reflect an estimate of it. This order is the reverse of their presentation in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, which orders words according to their 'logical' relations. Therefore we need a clear stance on how to use these dictionaries when we wish to decide on the 'decontextualized' meaning of a word and hence the content of its related concept.
What is needed is the definition of 'literal' as discussed above. 'Literal' is that which may be used directly to talk about experience; metaphorical is that which needs a mapping operation from one domain to another. Given the nature and function of most metaphor, we require a special status for the concrete, material meaning attached to words that may also be extended into abstraction. It is assumed that this 'experientialist' starting-point lies at the basis of most contemporary research into conceptual metaphors, and it is therefore best to explicitly adopt it in order to see how far it can take us. Whether language users actually all behave with such a focus on their bodies and the material environment, and whether all metaphorical language use may be explained with reference to such an assumption, is a testable hypothesis that may be empirically investigated by systematically analysing the data. For such a project to be reliable and valid, however, one needs an instrument for identifying the relevant cases, which is what this procedure is all about.
Note that not every word can be assigned such a privileged concrete meaning. Many words only have abstract meanings. Does this mean that they cannot be used metaphorically? The answer is negative, as is demonstrated by the possibilities of LOVE IS ART, LOVE IS SCIENCE and LOVE IS POLITICS. In such cases one probably would need the first, most frequent dictionary meaning of the terms 'art', 'science' and 'politics' to decide whether they are used metaphorically. A brief check of the COBUILD ELD may support this impression.
If a concept is not used in its typical meaning as we have now defined it, this may be because of metaphor or metonymy. (It is also possible that metaphor and metonymy are present at the same time, in which case the use of a concept needs to be identified as both.) Metonymy involves the nonliteral use of a concept which stays within the limits of its own conceptual domain, and which does not have to involve abstraction in the way most metaphor does, depending as metonymy does on part-whole, product-producer relationships, and so on. By contrast, metaphor involves the nonliteral mapping of correspondences between two conceptual domains.
The decision about the identity or difference between two domains is the most fundamental problem for every metaphor identification procedure. It is a problem that we cannot solve here. The question about the difference between two domains will be dutifully invoked in unclear cases, however. When identifying a metaphor as a metaphor, the question is whether it is possible at all to construct a nonliteral comparison statement, analogy and mapping between two domains conceptualized as two different domains. If it is, then the expression ought to be included as metaphorical.
The nonliteral part of a conceptual metaphor being a conceptual predicate or argument, it frequently emerges as a single noun, verb, adjective, or adverb in the discourse. We have begun our identification project by concentrating on the four main lexical classes of content words, making it easier to make a start with metaphor identification in discourse. However, as we have seen above, many function words are used as substitutes for these main lexical classes, and they have not been ignored. Moreover, as was shown with reference to the fourth line of the Browning poem, metaphorical propositions may also be realized by means of ellipses, in fact omitting the metaphor focus from the linguistic surface structure. These are the most interesting cases that may be marshalled to show the use of a distinction between a linguistic and a conceptual level of analysis for the identification of metaphor once a cognitive approach to metaphor has been accepted.
There is also a host of metaphors that involve the nonliteral use of prepositions, but they are somewhat less easy to handle (but cf. Lindstromberg, 1998) . Many prepositions are delexicalized, which presents special problems for analysis and hence identification. We have left them for a later stage of development so that we can build on our experience and hopefully consensus regarding the clearer cases. The metaphorical use of other word classes, including phrasal verbs, may often be even more difficult to handle, and there may also be a separate issue about the notion of grammatical metaphor in general. But all of this will be addressed at a later stage of research, once it has been shown that the clearer cases can be adequately handled.
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Language and Literature 2002 11(1) 3 The procedure A complete explication of the procedure would include the following steps: PREPARATION 1. Break up discourse into units -this creates a list of all semi-independent clauses. 2. Break up units into propositions -this produces a series of linearly and hierarchically ordered nuclear clauses with one predicate and at most three arguments; this also turns all attributive presuppositions into complete propositions. 3. Explicate the concepts involved in ellipsis, substitution and co-reference depending on pronominalization, deictics and alternative but general expressions (like thing, man and so on). 4. Explicate all non-realized but semantically conventional arguments of a predicate by abstract indications of their role. IDENTIFICATION 5. Check whether arguments referring to entities in the text world do so literally, that is, directly, or whether they (can) invoke another, especially more concrete or typical, domain of usage -this should take care of all nominally used words. 6. Check whether predicates or arguments designating properties of entities in the textworld or relations between entities in the textworld do so literally, that is, directly, or whether they (can) invoke another, especially more concrete or typical, domain of usage -this should take care of all predicatively used words. 7. Check whether predicates or arguments designating properties of relations or of properties of entities in the text world do so literally, that is, directly, or whether they (can) invoke another, especially more concrete or typical, domain of usagethis should take care of all attributively and adverbially used words.
It should be observed that this is a logical and complete explication of the procedure. In practice, propositional analysis does not have to be used first and then be followed by a round of metaphor identification. If anything, practice often works the other way round, propositional analysis only coming in when identification by means referent checking runs into difficulties. However, I would like to insist that this is so only if you know how to analyse texts in a propositional fashion, that is, conceptually and referentially. To the beginning student, propositional analysis could be useful as an instrument to acquire this nonformal, functional attitude towards the text. It helps to see what is going on in the text and what the textworld is about.
Advanced analytical practice may only require propositional analysis when encountering problematic and complicated cases, in order to determine which and how many mappings are at stake in a particular unit. This would also make the whole procedure less laborious, since one can begin with underlining the full words that are used metaphorically and take it from there, instead of producing propositional analyses for every sentence beforehand. However, propositional analysis certainly becomes inevitable when mappings are to be made explicit (see Steen, 1999) and when conceptual metaphors are to be related to their linguistic expressions.
A demonstration
Let us return to the Browning poem 'Parting at Morning' and see how the procedure fares when we take the text from one line to the next.
Parting at Morning
Step 1 of the preparatory stage says 'break up discourse into units'. Each of the four lines of the poem is a unit in its own right, according to this approach, with a finite verb signalling clausehood in the first three lines and an ellipted complement plus finite verb in the fourth line doing the same in an implicit fashion. None of the lines contains any other clauses, so that there is no problem here with regard to further subdivisions of lines into more than one unit.
Step 2 requires the break-up of units into propositions, which means the creation of a series of linearly and hierarchically ordered nuclear conceptual structures with one predicate and at most three arguments. Moreover, all attributive presuppositions are to be treated as complete, independent propositions. For the first line, Round the cape of a sudden came the sea, we get the following result:
The main proposition is determined by the finite verb of the clause, which is the intransitive come, which hence requires only one argument, sea. Grammatical features such as tense and determinacy are omitted, for we are dealing with concepts and their use in relation to a conceptual or abstract situation model. When the main proposition of a unit is accounted for, you proceed to deal with 'modifiers' of the main proposition (Bovair and Kieras, 1985) . In the present case, both round the cape and of a sudden qualify as such modifiers, and they are represented in the order in which they are encountered in the sentence. They are also represented as modifiers of the first proposition, which is the feature of the Bovair and Kieras procedure that may have to be amended for our purposes: some adverbial adjuncts are propositional while others are verbal, with a good many being ambiguous between the two. They are also formulated as independent propositions, suggesting, in somewhat awkward paraphrase, that 'the coming of the sea is round the cape' and that 'the coming of the sea is of a sudden'. Each of these ideas is available for further analysis regarding metaphorical or nonmetaphorical content. The second sentence runs And the sun looked over the mountain's rim:, which is analysed as follows:
Notice that the conjunction is not represented, for it does not signal logical coordination, which is the way AND is used by Bovair and Kieras. (This is another feature that may come in for alteration, if we want to achieve a linguistically responsible propositional analysis of a discourse. The role of conjunctions may become particularly important for the description of nonliteral comparisons or simile.) The main proposition is determined by the transitive verbal phrase look over, which requires a grammatical complement. The main proposition does not have a modifier itself, but one of its arguments does, rim, which appears to be possessed by the mountain. This is treated as a modifier of a main argument, and is represented as a lower-level proposition; but notice that the lower-level proposition is formulated as an independent proposition, meaning that 'the mountain possesses a rim'. POSSESS is a technical predicate which captures the meaning of the genitive. The third unit runs: And straight was a path of gold for him. This line cannot be analysed without taking into consideration step 3 of the procedure, which tells us to 'explicate the concepts of all ellipsis, substitution, and co-reference depending on pronominalization, deictics, and alternative but general expressions (like thing, man, and so on)'. In the present case, the referent related to the word him needs to be resolved before a complete proposition may be suggested. Both the preceding unit and the image in the current unit make it most likely that it is the sun that is meant here. If this is accepted, line 3 receives the following propositional analysis:
Note may be taken of the ignoring of the And again; of the loss of the inverted word order in the propositional representation; and of the order in which the modifier of the main proposition, P2, is given precedence over the modifier of one of its arguments, P3. It should also be observed that the genitive has a technical predicate, POSSESS, while the preposition of may be retained as a predicate of its own, OF. This is another matter of the Bovair and Kieras technique that could do with some further research, the question of retaining of prepositions as they are or their translation into semantic primitives like LOCATION, TIME, and so on. The last unit, And the need of a world of men for me, also requires the application of step 3 of the procedure, this time in order to recover the ellipted This representation shows a number of features that have become familiar by now. It presents a list of mini ideas to the effect that 'a particular need is straight', that 'the straightness of the need holds for the speaker', that 'the need is of a world' and that 'the world is of men'. This concludes our preparation of the materials before we can embark on metaphor identification proper. Each of the propositional representations of the utterances of the text may now be systematically examined for a possible indirect application of concepts to the presumed referents in the situation model. The procedure begins with picking out the arguments designating entities.
Line 1 contains the arguments SEA, CAPE and SUDDEN. The first two designate entities of which it may be presumed that they are actually part of the situation projected by the text. These concepts are not used metaphorically. SUDDEN is an argument which is treated as a modifier under step 3 of the identification part of the procedure.
Line 2 contains the arguments SUN, RIM and MOUNTAIN, and they all appear to be used directly in their designation of the related entities in the projected situation. There is a good deal of referential association between the items in lines 1 and 2, which all belong to one conceptual domain, which may provisionally be labelled 'natural scenery'.
Line 3 presents an interesting variation on this theme, for it contains the elements PATH and SUN as arguments designating entities in the situation model. We have discussed that SUN is an interpretation of the anaphoric pronoun him, wherefore it is automatically identical with the entity SUN analysed as literal in line 2. However, PATH is more intricate. It designates another entity than an actual path, but an actual path would easily fit in with the literal domain of 'natural scenery' invoked above. How do we know that it does not designate an actual path, and what is the entity in the situation that it does refer to? The answer to this question must lie in the use of the concept GOLD, which designates an attribute of the path in question, and turns it from a potential mountain path into another kind of path, since mountain paths are not made of gold. This combination of concepts turns the entity of the path into an unreal, metaphorical one, and the association with gold provides the clue that it may be related to the colour of the light of the sun. The path in question may then be interpreted as the projection of the sun rays on the scenery. The crossing of two domains involves the ones of SUNLIGHT and PATH, then, in which an abstract trajectory for light is mapped onto a concrete trajectory for physical movement. These are two different conceptual domains, even though they are both part of the thematic domain of the text, 'natural scenery'. The relative, local and ad hoc nature of the distinction between two conceptual domains could not be illustrated better. By the same token, nor could the challenge to the discourse analyst who wants to keep all this under control.
Line 4 mentions the arguments NEED, SPEAKER, WORLD and MEN, all of which are literal designations of their respective entities. They are part of a completely different thematic conceptual domain than the one in focus until now. At first glance their relation seems purely literal, though, with one domain simply taking over from the other in one text.
Our next task is to deal with the predicates and arguments designating attributes of entities or relations between them. This pertains to COME and ROUND in line 1. The latter is unproblematic and literal, and moreover a preposition, with which we are not concerned at the beginning of this project. The former is another subtle problem, however, for it is not easy to explain why a sea cannot literally come round a cape and why this has to be a metaphorical phrasing of a visual sense perception. This has to be related to the role of SUDDEN, which makes it less plausible for a complete sea to come round a cape of a sudden: this would be possible in a catastrophic story, but that is not at issue here. It is more likely that the aspect of suddenness relates to the visual experience of the persona of the poem, who unexpectedly and in one moment receives a visual image of the sea. This issue will not be addressed further here, but Heywood et al. (2002) provide a more complete and sophisticated indication of the problems involved in deciding whether a word is used metaphorically or not.
Line 2 presents us with an easier case, where we have to deal with LOOK-OVER as a metaphorically used concept for the actual relation between the sun and the mountain's rim. It is clear that a sun cannot look over anything except in fairy tales, and the cross-domain mapping that has been performed by the poet here has been one of SUN IS PERSON.
The property predicated of the path of gold in line 3 is that it was straight, which is another interesting case. Since the word straight may be literally applied to entities like paths, and since this particular path was seen to be metaphorical, or part of the source domain of the metaphor in line 3, straight may also be part of that domain and involve a metaphorical usage. But this is not necessarily the case, for the concept STRAIGHT may also be applied directly to the target concept of trajectory of SUNLIGHT. As a result, it may either be seen as directly predicating an attribute of the source concept PATH, yielding an integrated image of 'a straight path of gold' for the sunlight, or it may directly predicate an attribute of the intended target concept SUNLIGHT, comparing 'straight sunlight' to a 'path of gold'. Therefore, straight is an ambiguous term (or a bridge term, in the terminology of Kittay, 1987) . This is where one needs a general rule to include everything that may be analysed as metaphorical in order to keep all potential cases on board and maintain systematic decision-making.
The last line predicates the attribute STRAIGHT of 'the need of a world of men'. Given that the concrete and physical sense of 'straight' has been primed in the previous line, it is not difficult to recognize its application to the abstract 'need' as metaphorical. It is less easy to identify the nature of the conceptual mapping, unless one said that A NEED IS A THING. Indeed, in the context of the poem, it is highly attractive to think that A NEED IS A PATH. This does produce a metaphorical relation between the two thematic conceptual domains of the poem after all, albeit through the detour of the source domain of PATH. Moreover, it invites the reader to see 'the straight need of a world of men' as comparable to 'the straight path of gold', which gives a subtle ironic twist to the poem, turning it from a sad hetero-erotic morning after into a joyful homo-social release and beginning of the day. But, as noted before, this also depends on one's knowledge of the companion poem, 'Meeting at Night'. This raises all kinds of questions about the next steps of the identification procedure: how does one proceed from identifying a metaphorical proposition to a nonliteral comparison, analogy and mapping? These questions lie beyond the scope of the present article, but are at the top of our research agenda (Steen, 1999; Semino et al., ms.) .
This concludes the application of the procedure. Again, the procedure is a logical reconstruction of all the steps that may have to be taken in preparing and identifying metaphors in natural discourse. Some steps may have to be applied at the same time while dealing with one particular concept, as was the case with our discussions of CAME and SUDDEN, PATH and GOLD, and STRAIGHT and PATH and GOLD. However, this may be handled without great difficulties if one has become familiar with all the aspects of the procedure.
Conclusion
A reliable procedure for metaphor identification has to set out from a firmly cognitive perspective on the nature of metaphor. However, this does not mean that such a procedure deals with cognitive processes of metaphor recognition. Instead, it postulates a conceptual structure, in the form of a list of propositions, which captures part of the conceptual content of a linguistic message. Such a list of propositions, or textbase, can be derived from the linguistic surface structure of a message by a fairly straightforward technique used in discourse psychology, propositionalization. This approach has the advantage that some of the linguistic 'noise' of messages is filtered out while it concentrates on the underlying minimal idea units contained in a message. It then facilitates the direct analysis of the use of concepts in propositions in connection with the referents in the state of affairs or textworld they are presumably intended to apply to. Some of these applications are literal and others are metaphorical (or metonymic), and the breakdown of a text into a series of propositions produces a list of minimal units of analysis that can be identified as such. It has been the purpose of this article to demonstrate that this approach is feasible. The outcome of applying the procedure is a list of metaphorical propositions, which may then be inserted into the next steps of the analysis in order to finally reconstruct the underlying mapping of an identified metaphorical linguistic expression (Steen, 1999) .
